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The IS-LM Model and the Liquidity Trap Concept: From Hicks to Krugman 
 
 
“So the General Theory of Employment is the Economics of Depression” (Hicks, 
1937, p. 155). 
“Depression economics is back” (Krugman, [1999] 2000, p. 156). 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the main features of John Hicks’s 1937 “Mr. Keynes and the Classics” is his 
identification of the assumption that there is a floor to the rate of interest on the left part of 
the LM curve as the central difference between J. M. Keynes’s 1936 General Theory and 
“classical” economics, a judgment that he repeated on other occasions ([1939] 1946, 1950, 
1957). The notion of a “liquidity trap” (a phrase coined by Dennis Robertson 1936, 1940, 
albeit in a different context) was conspicuous in macroeconomic textbooks of the 1950s and 
1960s (see, e.g., Hansen, 1953; Ackley, 1961; Bailey, 1962), but it gradually receded into the 
background until it came to the fore again in the recent literature triggered by the Japanese 
depression and the experience of low inflation and low nominal interest rates in the United 
States and Europe in the late 1990s (see, e.g, McKinnon and Ohno, 1997, ch. 5; Fuhrer and 
Madigan, 1997; Krugman, 1998, [1999] 2000; Svensson, 2001; Woodford, 2002; special 
issues of the Journal of Money Credit and Banking, November 2000, and of the Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economics, December 2000; Benhabib et al, 2002). The 
revival of interest in the notion of a liquidity trap as a constraint on the effectiveness of 
monetary policy is also visible in connection with references by modern textbooks to the 
Japanese depression (see, e.g., Gordon, 2000;  Froyen, 2002; Colander and Gamber, 2002; 
Gärtner, 2003; Mankiw, 2003; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003).  
  Whereas the liquidity trap literature traditionally associated with Keynes (1936) and 
Hicks (1937) concerned the existence of a positive floor to the interest rate, the recent 
approach investigates the possibility of a zero lower bound on interest rates. This is in part 
explained by the shift from Keynes’s model - where the long-term interest rate is the relevant 
opportunity cost in money demand, and expectations about the future values of that long rate 
are assumed to be regressive or inelastic - to the formulation of money demand in terms of 
the short-term nominal interest rate, which affects the long rate through the expectations 
theory of the term structure of interest rates.  
  The purpose of the present paper is to discuss how the development of the liquidity 
trap concept is associated with the interpretation of the IS-LM model in general and the LM 
curve in particular, with emphasis on the original formulation by Hicks and the new 
interpretation put forward by Paul Krugman and others. The next section argues that the 
1937 article should be seen against the background of Hicks’ Value and Capital. Section 2 
also shows how Hicks’s notion of an interest rate floor grew out of his theory of the term-
structure advanced in the 1939 book and mentioned in the 1937 article. Hicks’s emphasis on 
the liquidity trap as the dividing line between Keynes and the “classics” is discussed in 
section 3. The development of the IS-LM model and the liquidity trap concept by Lange 
(1938), Modigliani (1944) and Hansen (1949, 1953) is the topic of section 4.  The modern 
approach to the liquidity trap is discussed in sections 5 and 6. It is shown that the recent 
literature shares with Hicks ([1939] 1946) the view that under liquidity trap conditions the 
central bank looses its ability to control the price level. Section 6 brings expectations into the 
picture.  
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2. Hicks on the rate of interest minimum 
The importance of Value and Capital for an understanding of the framework of the 1937 IS-
LM article was pointed out by Hicks himself. Hicks (1979, p. 990) explained how his 
diagrammatic representation of equilibrium in three markets (goods, money and bonds) on a 
two-dimmensional diagram was based on his work on three-way exchange, eventually 
published as chapter 5 of his 1939 book. In correspondence with Warren Young (1987, p. 
98), Hicks recalled that “during those years (34-38 inclusive) my thought was mainly 
directed to the writing of Value and Capital (to be published in early ‘39); anything else was 
a side-line. Not even an independent side-line”. This section discusses how the 1939 book 
influenced Hicks’s 1937 article in two ways: the general relation between price expectations 
and stability, and the determination of interest rates.  
  In part III of Value and Capital Hicks introduced the method of “temporary 
equilibrium” in order to discuss economic dynamics. Equilibrium is defined over a period of 
time (the “Hicksian week”) when supply and demand in the various markets are adjusted to 
price expectations held at the start of the period (“Monday”). It was in that context that Hicks 
introduced the notion of elasticity of price expectations to study the effect of actual prices on 
price-expectations. Hicks ([1939] 1946, p. 205) defined the elasticity of a “person’s 
expectations of the price of commodity X as the ratio of the proportional rise in expected 
future prices of X to the proportional rise in its current price”. If price expectations are 
completely inelastic (zero elasticity), individuals interpret price changes as temporary. If the 
elasticity of expectations is unity, price changes are expected to be permanent. As long as 
elasticities of expectations are zero, any change in current prices will bring about large 
substitution effects over time in markets for inputs and outputs, which will stabilize the 
economic system. But, if changes in current prices are expected to be permanent there will be 
no opportunities left for substitution over time. As pointed out by Hicks (p. 251), the case of 
unity elasticities of expectations was at the time implicitly taken for granted by most 
economists, without realizing its implications for stability analysis.
1  If elasticities of 
expectation are unity, the expected future price level changes together with current prices, 
which precludes stabilization through a reduction in the expected real rate of interest and 
leads to cumulative falling prices. 
Technically, then, the case where elasticities of expectations are equal to unity 
marks the dividing line between stability and instability ... The proposition 
which we have thus established is perhaps the most important proposition in 
economic dynamics (Hicks [1939] 1946, p. 255). 
We have assumed so far a given (nominal) rate of interest, but changes in current prices 
(expected to remain at the new higher or lower level) will affect the demand for money and 
therefore, for a given money supply, will bring about changes in the interest rate required to 
equilibrate the market for money. An increase of the interest rate is effective to check a rise 
in prices, but in the case of falling prices the interest rate mechanism may be unable to 
stabilize the economy. 
If the rate of interest was reasonably high to begin with, it seems possible that 
this reaction may take place without difficulty. But if the rate of interest is 
very low to begin with, it may be impossible for it to fall further - since... 
securities are inferior substitutes for money, and can never command a higher 
price than money. In this case, the system does not merely suffer from 
imperfect stability; it is absolutely unstable. (Hicks [1939] 1946, p. 259). 
The notion that the central bank cannot avoid a process of falling prices once the interest rate 
hits its minimum level is an important feature of the depression, according to Hicks. It is                                                                                                                                                   3
based on his hypothesis - advanced in chapter XIII of Value and Capital - that the short-term 
rate of interest is determined by transaction costs, that is, by the lack of general acceptability 
or imperfect “moneyness” of very short bills (p. 166). Long rates are then determined by 
expectations about the future course of the short rate according to the theory of the term 
structure introduced in chapter XI of that book. Hicks’s theory of interest was developed as a 
reaction against Keynes’s (1936, ch. 13) view that the current rate of interest is determined 
by risk and uncertainty about its future value. In a famous passage, Hicks (p. 164) pointed 
out that “to say that the rate of interest on perfectly safe securities is determined by nothing 
else but uncertainty of future interest rates seems to leave interest hanging by its own 
bootstraps; one feels an obstinate conviction that there must be more in it than that.” Hicks’s 
solution is that while the current long rate depends on the expected short rates, the current 
short rate is not dependent on expectations, but on the current supply and (transactions) 
demand for money. Hicks’s approach to the determination of the interest rate was followed 
by Keynesian economists like Kaldor (1939; see especially pp. 13-14) and Kalecki ([1943] 
1991, pp. 138-39).
2 According to Hicks (1937, p. 154), the demonstration of the interest rate 
minimum is “so important that I shall venture to paraphrase the proof, setting it out in a 
rather different way from that adopted by Mr. Keynes.”   
If the costs of holding money can be neglected, it will always be profitable to 
hold money rather than lend it out, if the rate of interest is not greater than 
zero. Consequently the rate of interest must always be positive. In an extreme 
case, the shortest short-term rate may perhaps be nearly zero. But if so, the 
long-term rate must lie above it, for the long rate has to allow for the risk that 
the short rate may rise during the currency of the loan, and it should be 
observed that the short rate can only rise, it cannot fall. This does not only 
mean that the long rate must be a sort of average of the probable short rates 
over its duration, and that this average must lie above the current short rate. 
There is also the more important risk to be considered, that the lender on long 
term may desire to have cash before the agreed date of repayment, and then, if 
the short rate has risen meanwhile, he may be involved in a substantial capital 
loss. It is this last risk which provides Mr. Keynes’ “speculative motive” and 
which ensures that the rate for loans of infinite duration (which he always has 
in mind as the rate of interest) cannot fall very near zero (Hicks, 1937, pp. 
154-55; italics in the original).
3 
Hicks deployed in his 1937 demonstration of the floor to the rate of interest the two main 
elements later developed in his theory of the term structure ([1939] 1946, ch. XI): the notion 
that the long rate is an average of current and expected short rates (the so-called 
“expectations theory” of the term structure) and the view that, under the assumption that 
speculators are averse to risk, they must be paid a liquidity or risk premium to induce them to 
hold long term securities (the so-called “liquidity-preference theory” of the term structure). 
Hicks added two important footnotes to the passage quoted above. The first (p. 155, n. 6) 
note argues that it is unlikely that individuals might interpret the very low short rate as 
permanent (which would bring the long rate also to a near zero value). Instead, they will 
interpret it as part of the business cycle and, therefore, be aware that it may possibly rise 
whether the economy improves (which would increase transactions demand for money) or 
gets worse (which would increase liquidity preference). Hence, the positive floor to the long 
rate is a short-run or business cycle phenomenon in Hicks 1937 discussion. The second note 
(p. 155, n. 7) claims that the “speculative motive” alone cannot account for the system of 
interest rates, anticipating some elements of his 1939 criticism of Keynes’s theory of interest.                                                                                                                                                      4
  Although  Hicks’s  1937  demonstration  of  the interest rate minimum differed 
from the one found in the General Theory (pp. 201-03), he made clear that it was an 
elaboration of an original idea by Keynes. The relation between Keynes’s and Hicks’s 
formulations is better appreciated with the help of the concept of “elasticity of interest-
expectations” introduced in Value and Capital (p. 260). Like the concept of elasticity of 
price-expectations, it expresses the effect of changes in current short or long rates on their 
expected values. Two cases must be distinguished, depending on whether interest-
expectations mean expectations of short rates or long rates. In the first case, if interest-
expectations are rigidly inelastic, a change in the short rate will have almost no effect on the 
long rate. Hence, the whole adjustment must be made through major changes in the short 
rate, and “it becomes very easily conceivable that downward adjustments may be necessary 
on a scale which would involve a negative rate of interest, if interest changes are to restore 
equilibrium”.  If interest-expectations are elastic, a reduction in short rates will be followed 
by lower long rates, which diminishes the danger of repercussions through interest 
“becoming inoperative because of the minimum below which interest rates cannot fall” (p. 
282). Hicks (p. 261) also made the argument in terms of expectations of long rates, which is 
closer to Keynes. If these expectations are inelastic - that is, if individuals interpret a fall in 
the long rate as temporary - the current long rate can only be reduced very slightly, since it 
cannot fall by more than the expected value (at the end of the period) of the long rate 
multiplied by itself.
4 As clarified by Kaldor (1939, p. 15) in a critical comment on Keynes 
(1936, pp. 218-19), it is the inelasticity of interest-expectations, not the uncertainty 
concerning future interest rates, that explains why the demand for liquid funds is highly 
elastic with respect to the long-term rate, making the long rate stable relatively to the short 
rate (see also section 4 below).  
 
3. Keynes versus the “Classics” 
The main reason why Hicks was so careful in his discussion of the existence of a floor to the 
rate of interest was that he considered it to be “the most important thing in Mr. Keynes’ 
book” (Hicks, 1937, p. 254), a judgment that he repeated in Value and Capital (p. 259) as 
part of his treatment of absolute instability downwards when prices are falling continuously. 
Hicks (1950, p. 141) was convinced that the nearly horizontal stretch at the left of the LM 
curve was “an essential part of Keynes’s argument”. He later reaffirmed that the individuality 
of Keynes’s theory vis-`a-vis “classical” economics is based on the assumption that there are 
conditions in which “the interest-mechanism will not work. The special form in which this 
appears in the General Theory is the doctrine of the floor to the rate of interest - the ‘liquidity 
trap’ as Sir Dennis Robertson has called it” (1957, p. 279). The IS-LM diagram, according to 
Hicks (ibid), shows that Keynes and the “classics” are “both of them special cases of 
something more general...Keynes’s model, though an extreme case of the general IS-LM 
model, is an extreme case that is outsdandingly important.” Among pre-Keynesian 
economics, Hicks (1937, pp. 152-53) distinguished between classical orthodox and the 
“revised and qualified Marshallian” theories - the former corresponds to the Cambridge 
quantity theory of money with a given proportion k between money and nominal income, 
while the latter (as formulated by F. Lavington and A. C. Pigou) acknowledges that the 
demand for money depends upon the rate of interest. However, the relevant comparison, 
according to Hicks, should be between Keynes and the revised theory of later Marshallians 
that prevailed when the General Theory was written, not between Keynes and the orthodox 
quantity theory of money.  
  Hicks’s suggested clarification of the difference between Keynes and the qualified 
classical theory is based on his analysis of the shape of his LL curve (renamed LM by                                                                                                                                                   5
Hansen, 1949). The curve will tend to be “nearly horizontal” on the left (because of the floor 
to the rate of interest discussed above in section 2) and “nearly vertical” on the right, because 
there is an upper limit to the velocity of money (Hicks, 1937, p. 154). This is illustrated in 
figure 1, where, as pointed out by Hicks, the LL curve approaches these limits 
asymptotically. If the IS curve lies to the right, it will cross the upward sloping section of the 
LL schedule, which means that an increase in investment will raise the rate of interest, as 
well as income and employment, just like in the revised classical theory. Keynes’s theory 
becomes relevant if, because of a weak inducement to invest or a high propensity to save, 
equilibrium lies on the left of the LL curve, since, on one hand, the rate of interest is not 
influenced by real factors, and, on the other, income is not affected by changes in money 
supply. As stressed by Hicks (p. 155), in this an increase in money supply cannot bring the 
interest rate down any further - the LL curve shifts to the right, but “the horizontal parts are 
almost the same”, as shown in figure 1. Therefore, Keynes’s theory is the “Economics of 





















Figure 1. HICKS'S LL CURVE WITH EXOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY 




Hicks’s description of the General Theory in terms of the left section of the LL curve was 
motivated not only by the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in the depression, but also by 
his attempt to discuss Keynes’s “startling conclusion” that an increase in the inducement to 
invest will not affect the rate of interest, but only employment (Hicks, 1937, p. 152). The 
point was discussed by Dennis Robertson (1936, pp. 182-83). According to Robertson, 
Keynes’s notion - that the rate of interest does not depend on the demand for loanable funds 
for use in investment - would only be valid if either “the liquidity schedule proper is 
perfectly elastic (the curve representing it a horizontal straight line)”, or the monetary 
authority expands the money supply and holds the rate of interest down in face of upward 
shifts of investment. Hicks had discussed the issue in his 1936 review of the General Theory, 
but he then focused  the argument on the conditions for the operation of the multiplier 
mechanism, which would bring about an increase in saving and, by that, in the supply of 
loanable funds (Hicks [1936] 1982, pp. 90-91).
6 The shift in the argument between the 1936 
review and the 1937 IS-LM article may in part reflect Robertson’s influence, but one should 
note that Robertson’s description of Keynes’s argument in terms of a horizontal LM curve 
with perfectly elastic demand for money is much closer to Lange’s (1938) later formulation 
than to Hicks’s careful discussion of a floor to the rate of interest as the left part of the LM                                                                                                                                                   6
curve (see section 4 below). Furthermore, Robertson (p. 183) decided to put aside the case of 
a horizontal liquidity schedule quoting a passage from the General Theory (p. 207) where 
Keynes wrote that “whilst this limiting case might become practically important in the future, 
I know of no example of it hitherto”. This is in contrast with Hicks (1937, 1950, 1957), who, 
despite Keynes’s ambiguity on the relevance of the  interest rate minimum (see Laidler, 
1999, pp. 258-59), had no doubts about its importance for Keynes’s theory.  
  Despite calling Hicks’s attention to the dependency of money demand on the rate of 
interest in the neo-Marshallian literature (of which he was part, of course), Robertson did not 
share Hicks’s implicit interpretation that the neo-Marshallians realized the full implications 
of that relation for the analysis of the investment-saving process in general equilibrium. In 
particular, according to Robertson (1936, pp. 188-190; 1940, pp. 19, 34, 36), the pre-
Keynesian literature did not take into account that an increase in the desire to save, even if it 
is spent on a purchase of securities, will not bring about an increase in investment in the 
same proportion. Pre-Keynesian economists overlooked the effect of a fall in the rate of 
interest (caused by an increase in the demand for securities) on money demand, which 
interrupts the fall in the rate of interest. 
Some part of the additional savings devoted by individuals to the purchase of 
securities will come to rest in the banking accounts of those who, at the higher 
price of securities, desire to hold an increased quantity of money. Thus the fall 
in the rate of interest and the stimulus to the formation of capital will be less 
than if the [liquidity schedule] were a vertical straight line, and the stream of 
money income will tend to contract...Liquidity  [is] a trap for savings. 
(Robertson, 1936, pp. 188-89, 190) 
Robertson’s (1940, pp. 34, 36) phrase “liquidity trap” was originally invented to illustrate the 
influence of a negatively sloped money demand on the saving-investment process, not a 
perfectly elastic money demand (which would be just a limiting case of the general 
Robertsonian liquidity trap). In terms of Hicks’s 1937 model, Robertson’s trap describes a 
leftward shift of the IS curve along an upward sloping LM schedule, with an ensuing 
reduction in income caused by the fact that the rate of interest falls by less than it would fall 
if the LM were vertical.
7  
  The notion that the short-term nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero was 
occasionally mentioned in the pre-Keynesian literature, usually in connection with the 
discussion of a deflationary process. This led “classical” authors to recognize the limitations 
of monetary policy in the depression.  
It is in order to counteract the effect of the falling prices that the bankers fix a 
rate of interest lower than the natural rate by the rate at which prices are 
believed to be falling...What if the rate of depreciation of prices is actually 
greater than the natural rate of interest? If that is so nothing that the bankers 
can do will make borrowing sufficiently attractive. Business will be revolving 
in a vicious circle...(Hawtrey [1913] 1962, pp. 186-87; italics in the original) 
The problem then, from Hawtrey’s point of view, is that the (Fisherian) expected real rate of 
interest is negative, but the bank rate cannot be lower than zero. Similar comments can be 
found in the 2nd edition of Robertson’s ([1928] 1948, p. 177) Money and in Pigou (1933, p. 
213). Hawtrey also introduced the notion of a “credit deadlock”. According to Hawtrey 
(1932, p. 172), it may be impossible in the depression to expand the money supply through 
the banking system due to a crisis of confidence that affects both the demand and supply 
sides of the credit market. Under these circumstances, open market operations are not able to 
increase money supply because banks are willing to hold excess reserves rather than lending. 
As indicated by Wonnacott (1978, pp. 193-94; see also Laidler, 1999, pp. 123, 286), the                                                                                                                                                   7
“excess reserve trap” argument advanced by Hawtrey is consistent with the quantity theory 
of money, since it is not about the ineffectiveness of changes in money supply (as in Hicks’s 
1937 liquidity trap discussion), but about the difficulty of increasing the money supply 
through the banking system in the depression. Despite the recognition in the pre-Keynesian 
literature of limits to monetary policy in the slump, those authors acknowledged that 
Keynes’s (1936, p. 207) suggestion of the possibility that “liquidity preference may become 
virtually absolute” at a low but positive long rate introduced a new element into the 
discussion. From this point of view, Hicks’s 1937 emphasis on the floor to the long-term rate 
as a Keynesian contribution is not contradicted by previous discussions of the zero lower 
bound in the “classical” literature. In contrast with most of that literature (and with part of 
the recent literature as well, as discussed in section 5 below), it is not based on the 
assumption of deflationary expectations.
8  
  Hicks’s 1937 formulation of the floor to the interest rate makes no reference to the 
banking system, which is also true of the basic version of his IS-LM model as a whole. 
Nevertheless, Hicks (1937, p. 157) did try to incorporate some features of a banking system 
by replacing the assumption of a given supply of money by a given “monetary system”. As 
Hicks (1950, pp. 142-43) pointed out later on, this becomes particularly important if under 
“money supply” one includes bank deposits, since the supply of deposits by the banking 
system is responsive to interest and income. The new LL curve will not feature in its right 
part a nearly vertical segment, as the money supply is not fixed anymore. The left part of the 
curve, on the other hand, will remain the same, which is not clear in Hicks’s (1937, p. 157) 
figure 3. The correct construction of the new LL curve under the assumption of endogenous 
money supply would be provided by Hicks (1950, p. 141), reproduced below as figure 2. If 
the monetary system is elastic - meaning that a rise in the rate of interest increases the supply 
of money - the economy will move from point P1 on curve L to P’2 on L’ (with a larger 
money supply) instead of P2 on the old LL curve. The new LL curve is formed by connecting 
the dotted points, each one corresponding to a different money supply for a given elasticity 
of the monetary system (see also Bailey, 1962, ch. 2). In the case of a perfectly elastic 
monetary system, the adjusted curve would become horizontal at the level of the interest rate 
minimum, corresponding to a mix of the Keynesian liquidity trap and the Wicksellian pure 



















  Money Income 
  Figure 2. HICKS'S LL CURVE WITH ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY 
Source: Hicks (1950, p.141).   
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Hicks’s IS-LM analysis gradually attracted the attention of the profession (Modigliani, 1944; 
Klein, 1947) until it became the standard representation of “Keynesian economics” after 
Alvin Hansen (1949, 1953) used the model to convey the essentials of macroeconomic 
theory to students (see Young, 1987, pp. 115-21). Before that, just a year after Hicks (1937), 
Oskar Lange (1938, p. 12, n. 1) put forward independently an alternative diagrammatic 
analysis that also focused on the form of the LM function (called by Lange, p. 28, 
“isoliquidity curve”) to establish that Keynes and the “traditional” theory are two special 
cases of a more general theory (p. 12). Just like Hicks, Lange discussed under what 
conditions Keynes’s claim - that the rate of interest does not react to changes in the marginal 
efficiency of capital or in the propensity to consume - holds. Lange (pp. 19, 28, 31) argued 
that Keynes “obviously...must have in mind” the limiting case when the “interest-elasticity of 
the demand for liquidity is infinite” and the isoliquidity curve “degenerates into a horizontal 
straight line”. Despite apparent similarities with Hicks (1937), one should note that their 
respective treatments are quite different. In Lange the issue is not the logical existence of a 
floor to the rate of interest created by a nearly zero short-term rate, but the empirical matter 
of the value of the interest-elasticity of the demand for money, without any mention of the 
speculative demand for money (or of the term structure of interest rates for that matter). 
Accordingly, while Lange described Keynes’s case as a completely horizontal LM curve, 
Hicks distinguished between the different parts of the LM curve. Lange’s approach has been 
adopted by several textbooks, especially when a linear formulation of the IS-LM model is 
deployed (see, e.g. Dornbusch and Fischer, 1978, ch. 4). 
  With Franco Modigliani (1944), the Keynes vs. “classics” issue changed from the 
discussion of the specification of the money demand function to the determination of money-
wages in the labour market (see de Vroey, 2000).
9 In contrast with Hicks (1937), Modigliani 
used the long-period version of the general classical model with perfectly flexible wages as a 
benchmark for comparison with Keynes. The floor to the rate of interest is still relevant, but 
only if the assumption of rigid money-wages is removed from Keynesian theory - as shown 
by Modigliani (pp. 74-75), if the interest rate is at its minimum level a reduction of money-
wages will only affect the price level, with no effect on employment and real wages. 
Modigliani (p. 77) tended to believe that the (Keynesian) assumption of rigid money-wages 
has a better empirical basis than the “Keynesian case” of a floor to the rate of interest, which 
he regarded as a special condition. Again, Hicks (1937, 1957) would not disagree with that, 
but would not accept the description of the “classical” model purely in terms of flexible 
money-wages.  
  Modigliani’s suggestion that one should draw the line between Keynes and the 
“classics” according to the assumption about money-wage rigidity was rejected by Lawrence 
Klein (1947). However, instead of resorting to Keynes’s hypothesis of infinite elasticity for 
money at some low interest rate (for which there was “not sufficient evidence”), Klein (pp. 
72, 85) claimed that the available empirical evidence indicated that the saving and 
investment functions are interest-inelastic. Accordingly, from Klein’s point of view, the core 
of Keynesian economics is the proposition that there is no positive value of the rate of 
interest able to equilibrate saving and investment at full- employment income. This is 
illustrated in figure 3 below, which shows the saving and investment schedules (continuous 
lines) at full-employment income Y0. Excess saving will be eliminated by a reduction of 
income to Y1, for which saving and investment (dotted lines) can be brought into equality at 
a positive interest rate. Although Klein distinguished sharply between the interest-inelasticity 
and the liquidity trap arguments, it is clear enough that they are not entirely disconnected, 
since his point about the inconsistency between saving and investment arises from the 
impossibility of reducing the nominal rate of interest below its zero bound.                                                                                                                                                    9
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Klein’s notion of a steep IS function was adapted by Hansen (1949, p. 79), with the 
suggestion that it becomes interest-inelastic at low income levels only.
10 As shown in figure 4 
below (where income levels, like in Klein, are expressed in real terms), the shape of 
Hansen’s LM is very similar to Hicks’s original LL, with its left part approaching 
asymptotically the interest rate minimum (see also Hansen, 1953, p. 146). In the diagram,Y0 
represents less than a full-employment, but a high employment real income. An increase in 
money supply shifts LM0 to LM1, with an expansionist effect since IS0 is interest-elastic. At 
the point of intersection of the IS1 curve and the LM0 curve, when output is Y1, the IS 
function is interest-inelastic, while the LM is highly interest elastic. Hansen (p. 80) pointed 
out that “monetary policy is ineffective” under these circumstances. However, Hansen’s 
explanation of the floor to the rate of interest differs from Hicks’s (1937), as well as from 
Modigliani’s (1944). According to Hansen (1949, pp. 64-65; 78; 1953, p.152), the floor to 
the rate of interest is explained by the fact that the compensation for bearing the risk of a 
change in (long-term) interest rates approaches zero as the interest rate declines. 
Figure 3. KLEIN'S SAVING-INVESTMENT INCONSISTENCY 
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Figure 4. HANSEN'S IS-LM 
Source: Hansen (1949, p.79).                                                                                                                                                   10
Hansen’s 1949 interpretation of the liquidity trap is not based on Keynes’s (1936, p. 201) 
analysis of the behaviour of speculators when the current long-term rate is below what they 
consider its normal or “safe” value. Instead, Hansen built on another element mentioned by 
Keynes (pp. 169, 202), that is, the notion that every fall in the interest rate reduces the 
“insurance premium to offset the risk of loss on capital account”. Hansen’s diagram was 
reproduced by Paul Samuelson in the 7th edition of his Economics (1967, p. 331), with the 
difference that the left stretch of the LM curve approaches zero, instead of a positive (short-
term) interest rate (see figure 5 below). This corresponds to Samuelson’s “depression pole”, 
when the LM curve turns horizontal at “vanishingly low interest rates, such as prevailed in 

































Figure 5. SAMUELSON'S  CLASSICAL AND DEPRESSION POLES  
Source: Samuelson (1967, p.331). 
 
 
Despite paying attention to the possibility of a liquidity trap, both Hansen and Samuelson 
dismissed its association with Keynesian economics. The notion that the IS-LM model 
represents “Keynesian economics” as a whole is quite clear in Hansen’s (1951; 1953, pp. 
147-48) assessment that both Keynes’s theory - which determines the rate of interest by 
demand and supply of money - and the “classical” theory of interest - which determines the 
rate of interest by equilibrium between saving and investment - are indeterminate. According 
to Hansen, Hicks provided the correct general equilibrium formulation by putting together 
Keynes and Robertson in the IS-LM model. Hansen’s influential identification of IS-LM 
with Keynesian economics was generally accepted in the literature. The question remained, 
however, whether money-wage flexibility could be able to bring the economy to its full-
employment output. It was in that context that the liquidity trap continued to attract attention 
in macroeconomic textbooks. Gardner Ackley (1961, ch. IX) provided a careful textbook 
discussion of the speculative demand for money and of the liquidity trap as an obstacle to full 
employment. Although Ackley (p. 363) used intensively the Hicks-Hansen IS-LM model, his 
presentation of the liquidity trap was based on Keynes’s hypothesis of regressive 
expectations, instead of Hicks’s (1937) term structure formulation or Hansen’s (1949) risk 
aversion argument. Keynes’s (1936, ch. 15) discussion of the circumstances in which 
liquidity preference becomes “virtually absolute” at a positive long-term rate of interest was 
marred by his tendency to interpret that phenomenon as a generalization of his speculative 
demand for money due to uncertainty as to the future of the rate of interest. However, as 
explained by Kaldor (1939) and especially by Robinson ([1951] 1952), Keynes’s argument                                                                                                                                                   11
about the floor to the long rate of interest does not really depend on uncertainty, since it is 
the very confidence with which speculators believe in the normal price of bonds that makes it 
difficult to reduce the rate of interest. Furthermore, the “normal” rate is not a constant 
magnitude, but it falls if the current long rate is continuously lower than the expected rate 
and if bear speculators are convinced that “the new low rate has come to stay”, which may 
shift the whole LM curve over time, including its horizontal stretch (Robinson, p. 30; 
Ackley, 1961, pp. 198-201; cf. section 2 above). In that case, both the short and long rates 
could fall as low as the zero bound.
11 
  
5. The recent approach to the liquidity trap 
The Keynesian liquidity trap argument gradually receded into the background in the 
macroeconomic literature of the 1970s and 1980s.
12 This is in part explained by the 
increasing attention devoted to the microfoundations of price and wage rigidity, with the 
relative marginalization of IS-LM analysis at the time (see Dixon and Gerrard, 2000). 
Another reason was the long experience with significant inflation rates in Europe, Japan and 
the United States, accompanied by high nominal interest rates. Hicks (1979, p. 994) 
remarked at the end of his comments on his contributions to Keynesian economics: 
Perhaps I should say something about the ‘floor to the rate of interest’, which 
was so important in Keynes’s own thinking, and which figured a good deal in 
my earlier writings on Keynes. One can see why it appeared, in the thirties, to 
be such an important matter; in the inflationary conditions to which we have 
now become accustomed, it is irrelevant.  
The return of the liquidity trap concept to the research agenda of monetary macroeconomics 
in the late 1990s reflected changes in the economic environment, with deflationary 
tendencies in Japan and near price stability in the United States and Europe. From a 
theoretical perspective, it also reflected the absence of a real balance effect in the new 
generation of IS-LM models based on optimizing behaviour. Moreover, the criticism of the 
traditional Keynesian approach to the demand for money as well as the focus on an economy 
with multiple financial assets, brought monetary theory closer to Hicks’s (1935, 1937, [1939] 
1946) treatment. The term-structure of interest rates (also called the “yield curve”) is 
prominent in Olivier Blanchard’s (1997, ch. 9) macroeconomics textbook. Blanchard (p. 193) 
draws an IS-LM diagram with the short-term rate on the vertical axis and, consequently, a 
very steep IS curve. An expansionary monetary policy, for given expectations of future 
interest rate or future output and assuming that the original short-term rate is positive, shifts 
the LM curve downwards, with a small effect on current output. If the expansion in money 
supply is accompanied by an anticipation of a lower interest rate in the future the IS curve 
will shift to the right as well, with a large impact on output. Blanchard’s (1997) emphasis on 
the term-structure is fully consistent with Hicks’s original insight, as discussed above in 
section 2.  
  The new generation of optimizing IS-LM models (McCallum, 1989, pp. 102-07; 
Walsh, 1998, pp. 202-11; Krugman, 1998, pp. 142-49; McCallum and Nelson, 1999) usually 
assumes, for mathematical tractability, that bonds last for just one period. The money 
demand function is specified in terms of a model of money as a medium of exchange 
(money-in-the utility-function, shopping time or cash-in-advance models), with the general 
result that the (short-term) nominal interest rate is positive only if money yields liquidity 
services (Walsh, pp. 57, 103). This is a formalization of Hicks’s insight in ch. XIII of Value 
and Capital (see section 2). Whether the nominal short-term rate can be pushed to zero or to a 
small positive number depends on the specification of the utility function and of the role of 
money in the economy. If money has no storage costs and there is a finite level of money                                                                                                                                                   12
balances at which there is satiation with the transaction services of money, it will be possible 
to reduce the nominal rate all the way to zero, as in Krugman’s (1998) cash-in-advance 
model (see also McCallum, 2000, pp. 875-76). Otherwise, there will be a liquidity trap at a 
low positive short-term nominal interest rate. As discussed above, Hicks and his followers 
(Kaldor, 1939; Kalecki, 1943; Modigliani, 1944) assumed that the lower bound to the short 
nominal rate was generally slightly above zero, but this makes no real difference for the 
analysis of a liquidity trap.  
  Apart from the specification of the LM curve as a function of the (short-term) 
nominal rate of interest, another important feature of the optimizing IS-LM models is the 
assumption that the IS curve is a function of the expected (long-term) real interest rate, that 
is, the nominal rate minus the rational expectation of the inflation rate. The notion that 
nominal rates matter for the LM, while real rates are relevant for the IS curve was firstly 
advanced by Martin Bailey (1962, pp. 50-51) in his discussion of inflationary equilibrium, 
but it became part and parcel of the textbook literature only gradually (see, e.g., McCallum, 
1989, pp. 112-117; Blanchard, 1997, pp. 139-42). Hicks ([1939] 1946) was, of course, aware 
of the distinction between real and nominal interest rates, which had been introduced earlier 
on by Irving Fisher.
13 However, in the framework of Value and Capital (and of the 1937 IS-
LM article), the assumption of unity elasticity of price-expectations was enough to yield 
Hicks’s instability results; price-expectations greater than unity could accentuate but in no 
way change the essence of Hicks’s argument, just like in the Wicksellian cumulative process 
of price change. Moreover, if the central bank follows a Wicksell-Taylor interest rate 
feedback rule - whereby the short-term nominal rate is set as an increasing and nonnegative 
function of the inflation rate - it can be shown that deflationary expectations, together with a 
lower bound to the nominal interest rate, may lead to a self-fulfilling deflationary spiral than 
cannot be avoided by monetary policy (see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2002).
14 
  Another factor that may bring about a liquidity trap in recent discussion is the 
possibility that the Wicksellian “natural rate of interest” - that is, the rate of interest that 
equilibrates saving and investment at full-employment income - is negative (Krugman, 1998; 
2000a). As discussed in section 4 above, Klein (1947) associated that possibility with the 
interest-inelasticity of saving and investment. In the modern framework, the natural rate of 
interest, as decided by the rate of time preference, will be negative if the marginal utility of 
consumption in the next period is greater than in the current period, which will happen if 
people expect their income to fall in the future (cf. Krugman, 1998, p. 150). Alfred Marshall 
([1890] 1990, pp. 192-93) had entertained the possibility of a negative natural rate, but 
apparently did not realize that, in a monetary economy, the actual rate of interest could never 
be lower than zero. While for Pigou (1943) the economy will eventually converge to its full-
employment growth path through the effect of falling prices on shifting the saving function 
(the so-called “Pigou effect”), Krugman argues that a fall in current prices will bring the 
economy back to full-employment equilibrium only if it represents an increase in the ratio 
between the expected future and the current price levels and, by that, a reduction in the 
expected real rate of interest to the level of the negative natural rate of interest.  
  The real balance effect is not generally part of the Euler condition used in deriving 
the IS function in recent optimizing IS-LM models. As discussed by McCallum (2000, pp. 
882-83) and   Woodford (2002, section 3.1), a real balance effect would arise if real balances 
entered the representative agent’s utility function and this function was nonseparable with a 
positive cross-derivative between consumption and real balances. However, even if the real 
balance effect is present in the IS function, this effect vanishes when the short-term nominal 
interest rate falls to its lower bound. As explained by Woodford (2002, section 4.2), 
additional real balances affect the marginal utility of expenditure only to the extent they can                                                                                                                                                   13
reduce the short-term nominal rate, which indicates the value of further reduction in 
transactions frictions from holding more wealth in money form. Hence, the real balance 
effect, as a liquidity effect, will not work under liquidity trap conditions (see also Rabin and 
Keilany, 1986-87, for a first formulation of this criticism). Nevertheless, the issue has not yet 
been settled in the literature, since the real balance effect might still work as a wealth effect 
(instead of as a liquidity effect) if consumption is formalized as function of permanent 




6. Krugman, expectations and the IS-LM model 
Krugman’s (1998, 2000a) discussion of the liquidity trap concept is particularly relevant for 
the purposes of the present paper, since he explicitly presents it as part of an intended 
reformulation of Hicks’s original IS-LM model (on Krugman’s argument see also Kregel, 
2000 and Sumner, 2002). Krugman (1998, pp. 138-39, 142-45; 2000a, pp. 224-27) put 
forward a simple rational expectation model of a representative agent that maximizes her 
intertemporal utility function and demands money according to a cash-in-advance constraint 
in an endowment economy. Under the assumption that there is no uncertainty and that the 
nominal rate of interest on one-period bonds is positive, the cash-in-advance constraint will 
be binding. The representative agent will hold just enough cash to make her consumption 
purchases, which implies a strictly proportional relationship between the money supply and 
the price level `a la quantity theory of money: P = M/y, where y is the output level, equal to 
consumption. This relationship is represented by the vertical line MM in figure 6 below, 
which describes equilibrium in the market for money - Krugman’s LM curve. The IS curve is 
obtained from the equilibrium in the market for goods, derived by Krugman from the Euler 
equation for consumption: (1 + i)(Pt/Pt+1)=(1/D)(yt+1/yt)
ρ, where D and ρ stand for the 
discount factor and relative risk aversion, respectively. This equation is illustrated by the 
curve CC in figure 6. The price level in the next period (Pt+1) is determined by Mt+1 and  yt+1, 
which are assumed to be given constants. Hence, a rise in the current price level generates 
expected deflation and a lower nominal rate of interest, for a given real (or “natural”) interest 
























Figure 6. KRUGMAN'S IS-LM WITH FLEXIBLE PRICE LEVEL 
Source: Krugman (1998, p.145). 
 
 
The representation of equilibrium in the markets for money and for goods in a flexible price 
economy in (i, P) space - instead of the (i, y) space of the usual IS-LM diagram - was 
originally advanced by Patinkin ([1956] 1965, p. 233; see also Krugman, 2000b). In terms of                                                                                                                                                   14
Hicks’s original framework, Krugman’s assumption that the future expected price level (Pt+1) 
remains constant when the current price level (Pt) changes means that the elasticity of price-
expectations is zero. As discussed in section 2 above, this implies, according to Hicks, that 
the system can be stabilized through intertemporal substitution, which is exactly Krugman’s 
conclusion. Krugman’s initial focus on a flexible price economy is necessary in order to 
explain under what conditions the central bank may loose its ability to control the price level. 
This can be illustrated in figure 6 by expanding current money supply - for a given long-run 
money supply and expected price level in future periods - until the MM and CC curves 
intersect at point 3, with a negative nominal interest rate. In this context, a liquidity trap 
arises if the economy is beset by deflationary expectations that shift the CC curve to the left 
or if the equilibrium natural or real interest rate is negative because of the time preferences of 
individuals. Krugman (1998, [1999] 2000, 2000a) discusses mainly the last factor, which he 
believes can be applied to the Japanese economy in the late 1990s (see also Kuttner and 
Posen, 2001). Under these circumstances, the current price level will fall in relation to the 
expected future price level, with an ensuing reduction of the real expected rate of interest to 
its negative equilibrium level. Again, it is Krugman’s assumption that the expected price 
level is given - in contrast with Hicks’s unity elasticity of price-expectations - that is behind 
the equilibration mechanism that prevents a cumulative price fall in the liquidity trap. Hicks 
([1939] 1946, pp. 271, 298) was aware that “people’s sense of normal prices” might 
counteract the initial effects of the unity elasticity of price-expectations and stabilize the 
economy in the depression.  
Krugman next investigates the role of monetary policy in a liquidity trap under the 
assumption that the price level in the current period is predetermined and that the 
consumption good is produced, instead of the price flexible economy with a given 
endowment discussed so far. In this case, output is determined by consumption demand, 
which is a decreasing function of the interest rate. The equation for the IS curve is now given 
by y = yt+1 (Pt+1/DPt)
1/ρ (1 + i)
-1/ρ, which is drawn as curve CC in the (i, y) space in figure 7 
below. Once again, expansionary money supply will not be able to increase output beyond 
point 2, which is supposed to be below its full-employment level illustrated by point 3. 
Nevertheless, in Krugman’s framework, this is only true if monetary expansion is seen by 
individuals as transitory, that is, if the future money supply is held constant. Even if the 
nominal rate of interest is zero, an increase in the money supply perceived to be permanent 
will raise current prices in the flexprice model, or output in the sticky price model, since the 
CC curve in figures 6 and 7 will shift upwards when individuals expect higher prices in the 
future. The upshot is that the liquidity trap concept involves now a “credibility problem”: 
monetary policy is ineffective only if people do not believe that monetary expansion will be 
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Figure 7. KRUGMAN'S IS-LM WITH PREDETERMINED PRICE LEVEL 
Source: Krugman (1998, p. 149). 















The notion that expected inflation could provide a way out of the impasse posed by a 
negative natural rate of interest can be found already in Bailey (1962, p. 101). Bailey 
dismissed its practical relevance on the grounds that “there is nothing to assure that such 
expectations will develop...there is no reason in principle why [expectations] should be so 
accommodating as to make equilibrium possible”. Krugman, though, claims that inflationary 
expectations can be generated by the perception by forward looking consumers of the future 
path of money supply. The assumption of forward looking expectations has implications not 
just for the liquidity trap concept, but for the interpretation of the IS-LM model as a whole. 
Indeed, as pointed out by Axel Leijonhufvud (1983, 1987), traditional IS-LM analysis is 
based on the notion that disturbances that shift  one of the curves will not at the same time 
affect the position of the other curve, which is not true under a rational expectations 
equilibrium. In particular, an anticipated monetary impulse will shift both IS and LM 
schedules, with the implication that the interest-elasticity of the two curves is largely 
irrelevant for the monetary transmission mechanism in general and for the liquidity trap in 
particular. The view that a permanent increase the money supply - as opposed to a temporary 
one - will shift both IS and LM curves to the right is conspicuous in the open macroeconomic 
model deployed by Krugman and Obstfeld (1994, pp. 392, 456, 474). That notion has been 
applied to the discussion of the liquidity trap concept in the 6th edition of the book, which 
has repeated Krugman’s 1998 argument (see Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003, pp. 499-501) in 
the context of an open economy. Krugman’s reinterpretation of the liquidity trap as a 
credibility problem has also made its way into recent macroeconomic textbooks (see, e.g., 
Gordon, 2000, pp. 135-38; Mankiw, 2003, p. 303).  
  The role of expectations in Keynes’s theory and in the IS-LM model was an object of 
concern for Hicks since his 1936 book review. Although Hicks hailed Keynes’s notion that 
short-period equilibrium depends on the state of expectations, he was critical of the 
assumption that such expectations could be treated as given when economic policy changes. 
In Value and Capital, expectations of price are determined by autonomous changes in the 
state of the “news” and by the elasticity of price-expectations (p. 204). Hicks ([1939] 1946, 
pp. 277-79) showed how an autonomous rise in price-expectations will shift demand in 
favour of current commodities at the expense of securities or money, with an increase in 
current prices. He did not apply that to the discussion of the liquidity trap concept, though, 
except indirectly by calling attention to the role of “normal prices” as a stabilizer at the 
bottom of the depression. The analysis of the influence of expectations of future monetary 
policy on the determination of the current long-term interest rate was not extended by Hicks 
to the determination of the price level (It is worth noting that Dennis Robertson had 
discussed in the 1920s the relation between price level expectation and future money supply; 
see Boianovsky and Presley, 2002). Later on Hicks (1969, p. 313) would point out that “one 
can grant that there exists an irrational element in expectations (the element of which Keynes 
made so much) without conceding that they are so irrational as to be random - and therefore 
incapable of being moulded, at least to some extent, by policy”.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Hicks’s formulation of a long-term interest rate minimum in the 1937 IS-LM article was 
based on his theory of the determination of the short-term rate by the marginal value of 
liquidity and of the long rate by the term structure, plus the double assumption of elastic                                                                                                                                                   16
price-expectations and inelastic interest-expectations. The theory of interest developed in 
Value and Capital has provided the foundation for much of the modern approach to the 
determination of interest rates, which helps to explain why Hicks’s 1937 presentation of the 
liquidity trap argument is in many ways closer to the recent discussion than Keynes’s or the 
traditional textbook version built on Hansen or Lange. Despite similarities between Hicks’s 
original treatment and recent literature, it should be noted that Hicks’s 1937 emphasis on a 
positive floor to the long-term rate of interest (following Keynes’s perspective) has not been 
shared in the theoretical discussion triggered by the Japanese depression of the late 1990s. 
Instead, the focus is on the lower bound to the short-term interest rate used as an instrument 
of monetary policy by the central bank. Accordingly, the rate of interest determined in recent 
optimizing IS-LM models is the rate on a one-period bond. Although it is occasionally 
mentioned (see, e.g., Krugman, 1998, p. 146) that in a liquidity trap the interest rate is zero 
(or nearly so) on short-period bonds only, this is not generally incorporated into recent 
models. In any event, the implicit justification for such an approach is that long-term interest 
rates are also bound as soon as the short rates have hit their (near) zero lower bound, which is 
not inconsistent with Hicks’s 1937 insight. As put by Hicks (1969, p. 314), the “famous 
trouble of the ‘floor’ to the rate of interest” is “one of the legacies to ‘modern’ Keynesian 
economics of Keynes’s preoccupation with the long rate”. However, a liquidity trap may also 
arise in IS-LM models where the short rate is used as the representative interest rate; in this 
case the floor will be (near) zero. By focusing analytically on the short rate minimum, the 
recent literature is led to stress deflationary expectations (just like some pre-Keynesian 
authors) or a negative natural rate of interest as necessary conditions for the emergence of a 
liquidity trap. Both elements are sufficient but not necessary conditions for the 1937 
demonstration of a Hicksian liquidity trap. In the same vein, the possibility of a liquidity trap 
in recent discussion is not related to the interest-elasticity of money demand or to the slope of 
the LM curve, since, by definition, money and bonds become perfect substitutes when the 
short rate hits its (near) zero lower bound. This is illustrated by Krugman’s formulation of a 
vertical LM curve to investigate the liquidity trap concept. 
  The revival of interest in the notion of a liquidity trap has not been generally 
motivated - in contrast with the discussion by Hicks, Lange and (to a lesser degree) 
Modigliani, Hansen and traditional textbooks - by an attempt to use the IS-LM model to 
distinguish between Keynesian and classical economics. We have seen that the liquidity trap 
concept played a key role in Hicks’s IS-LM exercise in part because of his encompassing 
description of neo-Marshallian monetary theory, differently from the original meaning of a 
liquidity trap as conceived by Robertson. Hicks’s suggestion that the General Theory is the 
economics of depression has been controversial in macroeconomic theory, but it did bring to 
the fore the idea of demand failures that cannot be corrected by cutting the interest rate all 
the way to its lower bound. This is the aspect of the liquidity trap concept that has attracted 
most attention recently (see, e.g., Krugman, [1999] 2000, ch. 9). The reexamination of the 
liquidity trap idea has been done in the context of optimizing IS-LM models, with emphasis 
on the expectations formation mechanism. Hicks was aware that the notion of a liquidity trap 
- and of aggregate instability in general - depends heavily on the assumption about price-
expectations. The instability results of his classic 1939 book and of the 1937 article are built 
on the assumption of unity (or higher) elasticity of price-expectations. Hicks’s notion of 
elasticity of price-expectations (that is, adaptative expectations) has been replaced in the new 
generation of IS-LM models by forward-looking expectations, which has led to new insights 
into the liquidity trap concept. 
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1. The association between instability and unity elasticity of price-expectations was first 
made by Knut Wicksell ([1898] 1936) in his famous discussion of the cumulative process of 
price change.  
2. Hicks’s notion that the short-term nominal interest rate becomes zero in the absence of 
transaction frictions was criticized by Modigliani (1944, pp. 82-86) and Patinkin ([1956] 
1965, pp. 109-10), on the grounds that the consequence of an increased liquidity of securities 
is not a lowered rate of interest, but a decreased use of money as a medium of exchange. 
However, Hicks’s result has been vindicated by recent monetary models (see Walsh, 1998, 
chapters 2 and 3). 
3. Haberler ([1937] 1946, p. 220) has been one of the few commentators to notice the 
similarity between that passage and ch. XI of Value and Capital.     
4. This comes from Hicks’s ([1939] 1946, pp. 149, 261, n. 2) formula that the net yield 
obtainable by investing in long-term securities for a given period is R + (R/R’) - 1, where R 
is the current long-term rate and R’ stands for the rate expected to rule at the end of the 
period. Since that expression is necessarily positive, R must be higher than R’(1 + R’), or 
approximately, R > R’(1 - R’), which gives the maximum possible fall in the current long 
rate. It corresponds to Keynes’s (1936, p. 202) well-known proposition that a liquidity trap 
will occur if investors expect long term rates to rise by more than the square of the current 
long interest rate (see also Kregel, 2000, p. 53). 
5. The notion that Keynes’s General Theory was designed to supply a theory for the Great 
Depression, despite the absence of explicit references to that episode in the book, has been 
forcefully argued by Robert Skidelsky (1992, pp. 440-41).  
6. See also Kregel (2000, pp. 42-47). Kregel, however, wrongly imputes to Hicks (1937) the 
argument that the horizontal stretch of the LM curve is based on the assumption of a high 
elasticity of supply of consumption goods or of money.  
7. It was in his review of Robertson’s 1940 Essays that Hicks (1942, p. 56) used for the first 
time Robertson’s phrase “liquidity trap for savings”.  
8. The deflationary process is important, however, to explain what Hicks ([1939] 1946, pp. 
264-65) called “depression psychology”, provoked by the impact of unexpected falling prices 
on the real value of debt and the ensuing “fear of bankruptcy”.  
9. Modigliani’s (1944) emphasis on the labour market as the dividing line between Keynes 
and the “classics” had been anticipated by Champernowne’s (1936) argument that, in 
Keynes’s framework, money-wages do not adjust quickly to changes in prices because 
workers’ price expectations are adaptative (see Boianovsky, 2004). Champernowne’s 
formalization of the differences between Keynes and the “classics” represented the main 
alternative at the time to Hicks’s IS-LM approach. Instead of Hicks’s general equilibrium 
with simultaneous equations, Champernowne stressed the distinct causality structures of 
Keynes’s and “classical” theories. 
10. Hansen (1949, pp. 79-80) sometimes associated the interest-inelasticity of the IS curve in 
the depression to capital saturation, but this is imprecise, since the capital stock is a given 
constant in the IS-LM model.    
11. The fall in the long-term interest rate in Great Britain in the mid 1930s was explained by 
Hicks (1967a, pp. 96-97) along similar lines.  
12. Tobin (1980, p. 5) was an exception to this tendency. Tobin explained a liquidity trap 
along Hicksian lines, that is, the fact that “the absolute floor for nominal interest rates is 
zero”, together with the notion that “long term rates...would be held above zero by 
expectations...that short rates will rise from rock bottom in future”.                                                                                                                                                    18
13. As pointed out by Hicks ([1939] 1946, pp. 119, 160; italics in the original) “it is only in a 
stationary state that actual prices do not need to be distinguished from expected prices;...that 
money rates of interest do not need to be distinguished from real rates of interest, and interest 
rates for one period of lending from interest rates for another.” It should be noted that 
Hicks’s proposition about zero interest rate in the absence of transaction frictions applies to 
the nominal, not to the natural or real rate. 
14. The modern notion of a liquidity trap can also be applied if the usual LM curve (based on 
the assumption that the central bank targets the money supply) is replaced by the assumption 
that the central bank follows an interest rate rule instead (see Romer, 2000). In this case, the 
zero lower bound puts a floor on the nominal interest rate that can be set by the central bank 
(although not necessarily on the real expected interest rate, if the expected rate of change in 
prices is positive). It is worth noting that Romer’s curve differs from Hicks’s suggestion of 
an elastic LM curve discussed above, since Hicks had in mind reactions by the private 
banking system to changes in the interest rate (just like in Wicksell), not an interest rate rule 
set by a central bank.  
15. Before the revival of interest in the liquidity trap, the notion of a zero interest rate was 
usually associated in monetary economics with Milton Friedman’s (1969, ch. 1) proposition 
that only monetary policies that generate a zero nominal interest rate will lead to satiation in 
money demand and, therefore, to optimality. The contrast between the optimality of zero 
nominal interest in Friedman’s framework and the depression scenario of the recent liquidity 
trap literature has been discussed by Uhlig (2000).  
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